[Important] Japan Health Ministry made rule that public and private sectors cannot discriminate against those who refuse to take vaccines. If any such complaint received then Human Rights Department will take action.

Govt made companies of Covid “vaccines” to warn of dangerous and potentially deadly side effects such as myocarditis. In addition, the country is reaffirming its commitment to adverse event reporting requirements to ensure all possible side effects are documented.

Japan’s Ministry of Health of health website says that the Govt. encourages citizens to receive the “vaccine”; however, they stress it is not mandatory,

“ Although we encourage all citizens to receive the COVID-19 vaccination, it is not compulsory or mandatory. Vaccination will be given only with the consent of the person to be vaccinated after the information provided.”

In addition, the government recommends those who are considering taking the shot carefully consider both its effectiveness and side effects.

Please get vaccinated of your own decision, understanding both the effectiveness in preventing infectious diseases and the risk of side effects. No vaccination will be given without consent.

Furthermore, they stress that businesses do not force employees to receive the experimental gene therapy. Nor should employees discriminate against those who refuse the injections,

Please do not force anyone in your workplace or those who around you to be vaccinated, and do not discriminate against those who have not been vaccinated.

The government even links to a “Human Rights Advice,” including instructions for handling any complaints if individuals face “vaccine” discrimination at work.

The decision is based on the principles laid down in Montogomerry’s case 2015 UKSC 11 and Universal Declaration on Bioethics & Human Rights, 2005.

Article 6 and 11  of Universal Declaration on Bioethics & Human Rights, 2005 reads thus;

Article 6.– Consent

Any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical intervention is only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of the person concerned, based on adequate information. The consent should, where appropriate, be express and may be withdrawn by the person concerned at any time and for any reason without disadvantage or prejudice.

Article 11 – Non-discrimination and non-stigmatization

No individual or group should be discriminated against or stigmatized on any grounds, in violation of human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In case of Montgomerry’s case [2015] UKSC 11, it is ruled that the doctors are bound to tell all the side effects and also about other alternate remedies including natural immunity to the person willing get any treatment. It is ruled as under;

“77. These developments in society are reflected in professional practice. The court has been referred in particular to the guidance given to doctors by the General Medical Council, who participated as interveners in the present appeal. One of the documents currently in force (Good Medical Practice (2013)) states, under the heading “The duties of a doctor registered with the General Medical Council”:

“Work in partnership with patients. Listen to, and respond to, their concerns and preferences. Give patients the information they want or need in a way they can understand. Respect patients’ right to reach decisions with you about their treatment and care.”

78. Another current document (Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (2008)) describes a basic model of partnership between doctor and patient:

“The doctor explains the options to the patient, setting out the potential benefits, risks, burdens and side effects of each option, including the option to have no treatment. The doctor may recommend a particular option which they believe to be best for the patient, but they must not put pressure on the patient to accept their advice. The patient weighs up the potential benefits, risks and burdens of the various options as well as any non-clinical issues that are relevant to them. The patient decides whether to accept any of the options and, if so, which one.” (para 5)

In relation to risks, in particular, the document advises that the doctor must tell patients if treatment might result in a serious adverse outcome, even if the risk is very small, and should also tell patients about less serious complications if they occur frequently (para 32). The submissions on behalf of the General Medical Council acknowledged, in relation to these documents, that an approach based upon the informed involvement of patients in their treatment, rather than their being passive and potentially reluctant recipients, can have therapeutic benefits, and is regarded as an integral aspect of professionalism in treatment.

80. In addition to these developments in society and in medical practice, there have also been developments in the law. Under the stimulus of the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts have become increasingly conscious of the extent to which the common law reflects fundamental values. As Lord Scarman pointed out in Sidaway’s case, these include the value of self-determination (see, for example, S (An Infant) v S [1972] AC 24, 43 per Lord Reid; McColl v Strathclyde Regional Council 1983 SC 225, 241; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 per Lord Goff of Chieveley). As well as underlying aspects of the common law, that value also underlies the right to respect for private life protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The resulting duty to involve the patient in decisions relating to her treatment has been recognised in judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, such as Glass v United Kingdom (2004) EHRR 341 and Tysiac v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 947, as well as in a number of decisions of courts in the United Kingdom. The same value is also reflected more specifically in other international instruments: see, in particular, article 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concluded by the member states of the Council of Europe, other states and the European Community at Oviedo on 4 April 1997.

82. In the law of negligence, this approach entails a duty on the part of doctors to take reasonable care to ensure that a patient is aware of material risks of injury that are inherent in treatment. This can be understood, within the traditional framework of negligence, as a duty of care to avoid exposing a person to a risk of injury which she would otherwise have avoided, but it is also the counterpart of the patient’s entitlement to decide whether or not to incur that risk. The existence of that entitlement, and the fact that its exercise does not depend exclusively on medical considerations, are important. They point to a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, the doctor’s role when considering possible investigatory or treatment options and, on the other, her role in discussing with the patient any recommended treatment and possible alternatives, and the risks of injury which may be involved.

83. The former role is an exercise of professional skill and judgment: what risks of injury are involved in an operation, for example, is a matter falling within the expertise of members of the medical profession. But it is a non sequitur to conclude that the question whether a risk of injury, or the availability of an alternative form of treatment, ought to be discussed with the patient is also a matter of purely professional judgment. The doctor’s advisory role cannot be regarded as solely an exercise of medical skill without leaving out of account the patient’s entitlement to decide on the risks to her health which she is willing to run (a decision which may be influenced by non-medical considerations). Responsibility for determining the nature and extent of a person’s rights rests with the courts, not with the medical professions.

87. The correct position, in relation to the risks of injury involved in treatment, can now be seen to be substantially that adopted in Sidaway by Lord Scarman, and by Lord Woolf MR in Pearce, subject to the refinement made by the High Court of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker, which we have discussed at paras 77-73. An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.

89. Three further points should be made. First, it follows from this approach that the assessment of whether a risk is material cannot be reduced to percentages. The significance of a given risk is likely to reflect a variety of factors besides its magnitude: for example, the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would have upon the life of the patient, the importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment, the alternatives available, and the risks involved in those alternatives. The assessment is therefore fact-sensitive, and sensitive also to the characteristics of the patient.

90. Secondly, the doctor’s advisory role involves dialogue, the aim of which is to ensure that the patient understands the seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated benefits and risks of the proposed treatment and any reasonable alternatives, so that she is then in a position to make an informed decision. This role will only be performed effectively if the information provided is comprehensible. The doctor’s duty is not therefore fulfilled by bombarding the patient with technical information which she cannot reasonably be expected to grasp, let alone by routinely demanding her signature on a consent form.

116. As NICE (2011) puts it, “Pregnant women should be offered evidence-based information and support to enable them to make informed decisions about their care and  treatment” (para 1.1.1.1). Gone are the days when it was thought that, on becoming pregnant, a woman lost, not only her capacity, but also her right to act as a genuinely autonomous human being.

Similar law is laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Common Cause Vs. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1,  Airedale NHS Trust Vs. Bland (1993) 2 WLR 316.

In the case of Common Cause Vs. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1, it is ruled as under;

“169. In the context of health and medical care decisions, a person's exercise of self-determination and autonomy involves the exercise of his right to decide whether and to what extent he/she is willing to submit himself/herself to medical procedures and treatments, choosing amongst the available alternative treatments or, for that matter, opting for no treatment at all which, as per his or her own understanding, is in consonance with his or her own individual aspirations and values.

 

Q. Conclusions in seriatim

202. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we record our conclusions in seriatim:

202.1. A careful and precise perusal of the judgment in Gian Kaur case [Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 374] reflects the right of a dying man to die with dignity when life is ebbing out, and in the case of a terminally-ill patient or a person in PVS, where there is no hope of recovery, accelerating the process of death for reducing the period of suffering constitutes a right to live with dignity.

202.2. The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur [Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 374] has not approved the decision in Airedale [Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, 1993 AC 789 : (1993) 2 WLR 316 : (1993) 1 All ER 821 (CA & HL)] inasmuch as the Court has only made a brief reference to the Airedale case [Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, 1993 AC 789 : (1993) 2 WLR 316 : (1993) 1 All ER 821 (CA & HL)] .

202.3. It is not the ratio of Gian Kaur [Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 374] that passive euthanasia can be introduced only by legislation.

202.4. The two-Judge Bench in Aruna Shanbaug [Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 454 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 280 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 294] has erred in holding that this Court in Gian Kaur [Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 374] has approved the decision in Airedale case [Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, 1993 AC 789 : (1993) 2 WLR 316 : (1993) 1 All ER 821 (CA & HL)] and that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation.

202.5. There is an inherent difference between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia as the former entails a positive affirmative act, while the latter relates to withdrawal of life-support measures or withholding of medical treatment meant for artificially prolonging life.

202.6. In active euthanasia, a specific overt act is done to end the patient's life whereas in passive euthanasia, something is not done which is necessary for preserving a patient's life. It is due to this difference that most of the countries across the world have legalised passive euthanasia either by legislation or by judicial interpretation with certain conditions and safeguards.

202.7. Post Aruna Shanbaug [Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 454 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 280 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 294] , the 241st Report of the Law Commission of India on Passive Euthanasia has also recognised passive euthanasia, but no law has been enacted.

202.8. An inquiry into Common Law jurisdictions reveals that all adults with capacity to consent have the right of self-determination and autonomy. The said rights pave the way for the right to refuse medical treatment which has acclaimed universal recognition. A competent person who has come of age has the right to refuse specific treatment or all treatment or opt for an alternative treatment, even if such decision entails a risk of death. The “Emergency Principle” or the “Principle of Necessity” has to be given effect to only when it is not practicable to obtain the patient's consent for treatment and his/her life is in danger. But where a patient has already made a valid Advance Directive which is free from reasonable doubt and specifying that he/she does not wish to be treated, then such directive has to be given effect to.

202.9. Right to life and liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution is meaningless unless it encompasses within its sphere individual dignity. With the passage of time, this Court has expanded the spectrum of Article 21 to include within it the right to live with dignity as component of right to life and liberty.

202.12. Though the sanctity of life has to be kept on the high pedestal yet in cases of terminally ill persons or PVS patients where there is no hope for revival, priority shall be given to the Advance Directive and the right of self-determination.

202.13. In the absence of Advance Directive, the procedure provided for the said category hereinbefore shall be applicable.

202.14. When passive euthanasia as a situational palliative measure becomes applicable, the best interest of the patient shall override the State interest.

 

306. In addition to personal autonomy, other facets of human dignity, namely, “self-expression” and “right to determine” also support the argument that it is the choice of the patient to receive or not to receive treatment.

517. The entitlement of each individual to a dignified existence necessitates constitutional recognition of the principle that an individual possessed of a free and competent mental state is entitled to decide whether or not to accept medical treatment. The right of such an individual to refuse medical treatment is unconditional. Neither the law nor the Constitution compel an individual who is competent and able to take decisions, to disclose the reasons for refusing medical treatment nor is such a refusal subject to the supervisory control of an outside entity;”

 

That as per above said legal precedents when the patient/person approaches doctor for taking vaccine or guidance then it is duty of every Doctor to:

(i)       To inform the patient about dangerous - death causing or any side effects of the vaccines and taking vaccine is not completely safe.

(ii)     To inform the patient about all the alternate remedies and better or any options available such that, the natural immunity developed in the body is much much better and superior than taking vaccines.

         (iii)      To inform that the vaccine is not a guarantee of any protection from Covid-19 caused due to the Sars-CoV-2 virus.

(iv)     To inform that the patient about any other alternate remedies which are either available in the official protocol of Government of India such as Ivermectin, Vitamin-D, Ayurvedic, Naturopathy, Anandia’s Ayurvedic composition as approved by the Hon’ble High Court in  Ponnekanti Rao Vs. State 2021 SCC OnLine AP 2171  etc.

(v)      To inform the patient that the vaccines are experimental and given Emergency Use Authorization (EUA).

(vi)     To inform the patient that even if he signs the ‘Informed Consent Form’, he is having rights to withdraw the said consent at any time.

(vii)   To inform that if he is having any allergy to any of the contents of the vaccine or if he is in any prohibited category then as per law and as per vaccine manufacturer’s own declarations, the person should not take the vaccines.

(viii) To explain everything to the patient in the language known to him/her and it should be in a simplified manner not in a high term scientific manner.

The government made companies of Covid “vaccines” to warn of dangerous and potentially deadly side effects such as myocarditis. In addition, the country is reaffirming its commitment to adverse event reporting requirements to ensure all possible side effects are documented.

These efforts from Japan’s health authority are in stark contrast to the deceptive measures taken by other countries to coerce citizens into taking the injection, downplaying side effects, and discouraging proper adverse event reporting.

For more details read the article:

https://rairfoundation.com/alert-japan-places-myocarditis-warning-on-vaccines-requires-informed-consent/

Alert: Japan Places Myocarditis Warning on 'Vaccines' - Requires Informed Consent Amy Mek

December 10, 2021

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